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Abstract  
Fault tolerance is often the only viable way of obtaining 
the required system dependability from systems built out 
of “off-the-shelf” (OTS) products. We have studied a 
sample of bug reports from four off-the-shelf SQL servers 
so as to estimate the possible advantages of software fault 
tolerance - in the form of modular redundancy with 
diversity - in complex off-the-shelf software. We checked 
whether these bugs would cause coincident failures in 
more than one of the servers. We found that very few bugs 
affected two of the four servers, and none caused failures 
in more than two. We also found that only four of these 
bugs would cause identical, undetectable failures in two 
servers. Therefore, a fault-tolerant server, built with 
diverse off-the-shelf servers, seems to have a good chance 
of delivering improvements in availability and failure 
rates compared with the individual off-the-shelf servers or 
their replicated, non-diverse configurations. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When systems are built out of “off-the shelf” (OTS) 
products, fault tolerance is often the only viable way of 
obtaining the required system dependability [23, 30, 12]. 
Fault tolerance may take multiple forms, from simple 
error detection and recovery add-ons (e.g. wrappers [22]) 
to full-fledged “diverse modular redundancy” [16]: 
replication with diverse versions of the components.  
Even this latter class of solutions becomes affordable with 
many OTS products and has the advantage of a fairly 
simple architecture. The cost of procuring two or even 
more OTS products (some of which may be free) would 
still be far less than that of developing one’s own.  
All these design solutions are well known from the 
literature. The questions, for the developers of a system 
using OTS components, are about the dependability gains, 
implementation difficulties and extra cost that they would 
bring for that specific system. 
To study the issues for a realistic category of OTS 
products we have chosen SQL database servers. These are 
complex products, with many faults in each release, and 
even features that imply an accepted possibility of an 
incorrect behaviour, albeit rare. An example of the latter 
is the known “write skew” [3] problem with some 
optimistic concurrency control architectures [7]. Further 
dependability improvement of OTS SQL servers seems 
only possible if fault tolerance through design diversity is 
used [11]. Given the many available OTS SQL servers 
and the standardisation of their functionality (SQL 92 and 
SQL 99), it seems reasonable to build a fault-tolerant 
SQL server from available OTS servers.  
The effort of developing an SQL server using design 
diversity (e.g. several of-the-shelf SQL servers and 
suitably adapted “middleware” for replication 
management) would require strong evidence of its 
usefulness: for example empirical evidence that likely 
failures of the SQL servers, which may lead to serious 
consequences, are unlikely to be tolerated without 
diversity. This paper starts to investigate such empirical 
evidence. We seek to demonstrate whether design 
diversity has a potential to deliver significant 
improvement of dependability of SQL servers, compared 
to solutions for data replication that can only tolerate 
crash failures. To this aim we are running experiments to 
determine the dependability gains achieved through fault 
tolerance.  
A preliminary evaluation step concerns fault diversity 
rather than failure diversity. By manual selection of test 
cases, one can check whether the diverse redundant 
configuration would tolerate the known bugs in the 
repositories of bugs reported for the various OTS servers. 
We have conducted a study on four SQL servers, both 
commercial and open-source. We collected known bug 
reports for these servers. For each bug, we took the test 
case that would trigger it and ran it on all four servers (if 
possible), to check for coincident failures. We found the 
number of coincident failures to be very low.      
  
We use the following terminology. The known bugs 
for the OTS servers are documented in bug report 
repositories (i.e. bug databases, mailing lists etc). Each 
bug report contains the description of what the bug is and 
the bug script (SQL code that contains the failure 
triggering conditions) required to reproduce the failure 
(the erroneous output that the reporter of the bug 
observed). In our study we collected these bug reports and 
ran the bug scripts in the servers (we will use the phrase 
“running a bug” for the sake of brevity). 
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we 
describe the background and motivation of the study and 
related work from the literature. In Section 3 we describe 
how the study was conducted and the terminology for 
classification of faults. In Section 4 we present the 
quantitative results obtained. In Section 5 we describe the 
bugs that caused coincident failures. In Section 6 we 
discuss the possible reliability gains to be had from using 
diverse OTS SQL servers and in Section 7 we present 
conclusions and possible further work.  
 
2. Background and related work 
 
2.1. Fault tolerance in databases  
 
Software fault tolerance has been thoroughly studied 
and successfully applied in many sectors, including 
databases. For example, standard database mechanisms 
such as transaction “rollback and retry” and 
“checkpointing” can be used to tolerate faults that are due 
to transient conditions. These techniques can be used with 
or without data replication in the databases.  
There are many solutions for data replication [4, 33, 
20], as a feature of many commercial SQL servers or as 
middleware that can be used with a variety of SQL 
servers. Typically, these replication solutions work with 
sets of identical servers. Jimenez-Peris et al [13] present a 
relevant discussion of the various ways in which database 
replication with OTS servers can be organised, namely 
treating the servers as white, grey or black boxes. All 
commercial offerings are of the white-box kind, where 
code necessary for replication is added inside the server 
product. The grey-box approach, as implemented in [14], 
assumes that servers provide specific services to assist 
with replication. The black-box approach uses the 
standard interfaces of the servers. Both the grey and black 
box approaches are implemented via middleware on top 
of the existing servers. To the best of our knowledge, a 
common assumption is made in the known replication 
solutions that the SQL servers will fail in a “fail-stop” 
manner [26], with detectable clean crashes, and leaving a 
copy of a correct state for use in recovery. Apart from 
simplifying the protocols for data replication, the 
assumption of crash failures also allows for some 
performance optimisation such as executing the 
modifying queries on a single server, which then 
propagates the updates to all other servers involved in the 
replication, a solution considered adequate by the 
standardising bodies [28].  
These approaches have shortcomings, i.e., they do not 
protect against failures that are not easily detectable (non-
fail-stop), and incorrect updates would be propagated to 
all the replicas. Using diverse SQL servers instead of 
servers of the same type would improve error detection 
and thus reduce the risk from incorrect results. 
Availability could also be improved because servers that 
are diagnosed as correct can continue operation while 
recovery is performed on the faulty server[s]. Elsewhere 
[21, 9] we describe some initial steps toward 
implementing middleware for data replication with 
diverse SQL servers. There, we also discuss some 
difficulties of data replication with diverse servers, such 
as the need to use the subset of SQL that is common to all 
servers used, and to translate all queries into the SQL 
“dialects” of these servers. 
 
2.2. Studies of faults and failures 
 
The usefulness of diversity depends on the frequency 
of those failures that cannot be tolerated without it. There 
have been comparatively few related studies.  
Gray studied the TANDEM NonStop system [10] and 
observed that over an (unspecified) measured period only 
one out of 132 faults caused failures deterministically, i.e. 
the same failure was observed on retry. Gray calls these 
“Bohrbugs”. The others, which he calls “Heisenbugs” 
only caused failures under special conditions (e.g. created 
by a combination of the state of the operating system and 
other software), difficult to reproduce artificially. 
Heisenbugs – so long as their failures are detected – can 
be tolerated by replication without diversity, as in the 
Tandem system. A later study, [17] of field software 
failures for the Tandem Guardian90 operating system 
found that 82 % of the reported field software faults were 
tolerated. However, 18 % of the faults did lead to both 
non-diverse processes in a Tandem process failing and 
therefore leading to a system failure. 
Related studies exist on determinism and fail-stop 
properties of database failures, but they, like our study, 
concern faults rather than failure measurements.  A study 
[5] examined fault reports of three applications (Apache 
Web server, GNOME and MySQL server). Only a small 
fraction of the faults (5-14%) were Heisenbugs triggered 
by transient conditions that would be tolerated by a 
simple “rollback and retry” approach. However the reason 
why there are few Heisenbugs here, and indeed in our 
study, might be that people are less likely to report faults 
that they cannot reproduce, and this is acknowledged by 
the authors in [5]. In another study [6] the same authors 
found (via fault injection) that a significant number of 
  
faults (7%) violated the fail-stop model by writing 
incorrect data to stable storage. Even though they report 
that this number falls to 2% when applying the Postgres95 
transaction mechanism, this number still remains high for 
applications with stringent reliability requirements.  
 
2.3. Diversity with off-the-shelf applications 
 
Other researchers have also considered the potential of 
diversity for improving the dependability of OTS 
software. Various architectures have been proposed that 
use diversity for intrusion tolerance: e.g. HACQIT [25], 
which demonstrates diverse replication (with two OTS 
web servers - Microsoft’s IIS and Apache web server) to 
detect failures (especially maliciously caused ones) and 
initiate recovery; SITAR [32], an intrusion tolerant 
architecture for distributed services and especially COTS 
servers; or the Cactus architecture [12], intended to 
enhance survivability of applications which support 
diversity among application modules. 
In another example, [2] uses diverse Java virtual 
machines for interoperability rather than for tolerating 
failures.      
 
3. Description of the study 
 
3.1. Bug reports   
 
Two commercial (Oracle 8.0.5 and Microsoft SQL 
Server 7 (without any service packs applied)) and two 
open-source (PostgreSQL Version 7.0.0 and Interbase 
Version 6.0), SQL servers were used in this study. 
Interbase, Oracle and MSSQL were all run on the 
Windows 2000 Professional operating system, whereas 
PostgreSQL (which is not available for Windows) was 
run on RedHat Linux 6.0 (Hedwig).  
We only used bugs that caused failure of a server’s 
core engine. We did not consider other bugs such as those 
that caused failure to a client application tool or various 
connectivity API’s (JDBC/ODBC etc.), because these 
functions in a future fault tolerant architecture would be 
provided by the middleware. 
For each of these servers there is an accessible 
repository of reports of known bugs. We collected: 
Interbase bugs [27] reported in the period between August 
2000 and August 2001; PostgreSQL bugs [24] reported 
between May 2000 and January 2001; Oracle bugs [19] 
reported between September 1998 and December 2002. 
Bug reports for MSSQL [18] do not specify dates; we 
used all reports for both MSSQL 7 and MSSQL 2000, 
available as of August 2003, that included “bug scripts” 
and were core engine bugs. For Oracle and MSSQL we 
collected reports from longer periods, because for these 
two servers (both “closed development” servers) some 
reports do not include bug scripts and we could not check 
whether the bug was present in other servers. By 
extending the collection period we obtained reasonably 
large (though obviously imperfect) samples of bug 
reports. Despite this, the sample that we could use for 
Oracle contained only 18 bugs, since most reports omitted 
the bug scripts.      
For each reported bug we attempted to run the 
corresponding bug script. Full details are available in [8].  
  
3.2. Reproducibility of failures 
 
All these servers offer features that are extensions to 
the basic SQL standard, and these extensions differ 
between the servers. Bugs affecting one of these 
extensions thus literally cannot exist in a server that lacks 
the extension. We called these “dialect-specific” bugs. 
For example, Interbase bug 217138 [8] uses the UNION 
operator in views, which PostgreSQL 7.0.0 views do not 
offer, and thus cannot be run in PostgreSQL: it is a 
dialect-specific bug. 
Another “reproducibility” issue arises when a bug 
script does not cause failure in the server for which the 
bug was reported. We called these bugs Heisenbugs, 
borrowing Gray’s terminology [10]. We intend to run the 
Heisenbugs again in a more stressful simulated 
environment [21] (with multiple clients and large number 
of transactions) to see whether repeated trials will give 
incorrect results.  
 
4. Quantitative results  
 
4.1. Detailed results  
 
In total we included in the study 181 bug reports: 55 
for Interbase, 57 for PostgreSQL, 51 for MSSQL and 18 
for Oracle. Out of these 181 bugs, 76 were “dialect-
specific” (could be run in only one of the four servers); 47 
could be run in all four servers; 26 could be run in only 
two servers and 32 in only three servers.    
Each bug was first run on the server for which it was 
reported, and (after translating the script into the SQL 
dialect of the respective server) on the other servers.  The 
bugs were classified into dialect-specific and non-dialect-
specific bugs; the latter were then further classified into 
Bohrbugs or Heisenbugs as explained previously. The 
failures were also classified into different categories 
according to their effects, as different failure types require 
different recovery mechanisms: 
Engine Crash failures: crashes or halts of the core engine. 
Incorrect Result failures: incorrect outputs without engine 
crashes: the outputs do not conform to the server’s 
specification or to the SQL standard.  
Performance failures: correct output, but with an 
unacceptable time penalty for the particular input. 
Other failures. 
  
We also classified the failures according to their 
detectability by a client of the database servers:  
Self-Evident failures: engine crash failures, cases in which 
the server signals an internal failure as an exception (error 
message) and performance failures.  
Non-Self-Evident failures: incorrect result failures, 
without server exceptions within an accepted time delay. 
Table 1 contains the results of this step of the study. 
Each grey column lists the results produced when the 
bugs reported for a certain server were run on that server. 
For example, we collected 55 known Interbase bugs, of 
which, when run on our installation of the Interbase 
server, 8 did not cause failures (possible Heisenbugs). 
The 47 bugs that caused failures are further classified in 
the part of the column below the double vertical lines, 
after the “Failure observed” row. All the performance 
failures and all the engine crashes are self-evident. 
Incorrect Result failures and “Other” failures can be self-
evident or non-self-evident depending on whether the 
server gives an error message.  
The three columns to the right of the grey one present 
the results of running the Interbase bugs on the other three 
servers. For example, we can see that 23 of the Interbase 
bugs cannot be run in PostgreSQL (dialect-specific bugs). 
Then we have the bugs that “require further work”: this 
means that we have not managed yet to translate the bug 
script in the PostgreSQL dialect of SQL, or are listed as 
“performance bugs” but we could not decide whether 
performance improves by changing servers. We plan to 
resolve this uncertainty via a testing infrastructure [21] to 
measure the precise execution times of the queries. 
Out of 55 Interbase bugs we managed to run 27 in 
PostgreSQL; only one caused a failure in both Interbase 
and PostgreSQL. This particular failure was a non-self-
evident incorrect result as can be seen from the table.  
As for the failure types, we can see that most of the 
bugs cause incorrect result failures. This will be discussed 
further in the Section 6. 
We observed a higher number of Heisenbugs in 
MSSQL and Oracle than in the other servers. This was 
documented by some of the bug reports, which indicated: 
“may cause a failure”. 
 
Table 1. Results of running the bug scripts on all four servers. IB stands for Interbase, PG 
for PostgreSQL, OR for Oracle and MS for MSSQL 
 IB PG OR MS PG IB OR MS OR IB MS PG MS IB OR PG 
Total bug scripts 55 55 55 55 57 57 57 57 18 18 18 18 51 51 51 51 
Bug script cannot be run 
(Functionality Missing) 
n/a 23 20 16 n/a 32 27 24 n/a 13 13 12 n/a 36 32 31 
Further Work n/a 5 4 6 n/a 2 0 0 n/a 1 1 2 n/a 3 7 2 
Total bug scripts run 55 27 31 33 57 23 30 33 18 4 4 4 51 12 12 18 
No failure observed 8 26 31 31 5 23 30 31 4 4 4 3 12 11 12 12 
Failure observed 47 1 0 2 52 0 0 2 14 0 0 1 39 1 0 6 
T
y
p
es
 o
f 
fa
il
u
re
s 
 Poor Performance 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 
Engine Crash 7 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
Incorrect 
Result 
Self-evident 4 0 0 1 14 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 10 0 0 6 
Non-self-evident 23 1 0 1 20 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 17 1 0 0 
Other 
Self-evident 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Non-self-evident 8 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
4.2. Summary of observed fault diversity 
 
Table 2 contains a summary from the viewpoint of the 
probable effects on a fault-tolerant server. Of the 47 bugs 
that could be run on all four servers, 12 did not cause 
failures in any of the servers: they are Heisenbugs for the 
server for which they were reported, and non-existent or 
Heisenbugs for the other three servers. 31 of these only 
caused a failure in the server for which they were reported 
and not in the others; and 4 bugs caused a coincident 
failure in two servers.   
In addition to these 47, we have many bugs that could 
be run only on a subset of the four servers and thus on a 
fault-tolerant server built out of this subset. The following 
sections in the table show the number of bugs that could 
be run in each of these different combinations (4 three-
version combinations and 6 two-version combinations), 
and how many caused failures or coincident failures.   
The last four columns show the 76 dialect-specific 
bugs, which could only be run in the server for which 
they were reported and therefore affect functionality that 
would not be available on a fault-tolerant diverse server.
  
Table 2. The number of bug scripts run and the effects on different combinations of servers 
The server(s) in which the 
bug script was run 
IB, 
PG, 
OR, 
MS 
IB, 
PG, 
OR 
only  
IB, 
PG, 
MS 
only 
IB, 
OR, 
MS 
only 
PG, 
OR, 
MS 
only 
IB, 
PG 
Only 
IB, 
MS 
Only 
IB, 
OR 
Only 
PG, 
OR 
Only 
PG, 
MS 
Only 
MS, 
OR 
Only 
IB 
Only 
PG 
Only 
MS 
Only 
OR 
Only 
Total number of bug scripts 
run 
47 3 7 12 10 5 3 0 4 12 2 17 18 28 13 
Failure not observed in any 
server  
12 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 3 
Failure observed in one 
server only 
31 3 6 9 9 5 3 0 3 7 1 16 16 23 10 
Failure observed in two 
servers 
4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
None of the bugs caused a failure in more than two servers 
 
4.3. Two-version combinations
 
We now look more closely at the two-version 
combinations of the four different servers in our study, to 
see how many of the coincident failures are detectable in 
the 2-version systems. We define: 
Detectable failures: self-evident failures or those where 
servers return different incorrect results (the comparison 
algorithm must be written to allow for possible 
differences in the representation of correct results, e.g. 
different numbers of digits in the representation of 
floating point numbers, padding of characters in character 
strings etc.). All failures affecting only one out of two (or 
at most n-1 out of n) versions are detectable.  
Non-Detectable failures: the ones for which two (or 
more) servers return identical incorrect results.  
Table 3 contains a summary of the results on each of 
the six possible two-version combinations. Here we only 
include bugs that could be run on both servers, i.e. we 
exclude dialect-specific bugs. Only four of the 12 
coincident failures we observed are non-detectable. We 
can see that diversity allows detection of failures for at 
least 94% of these bugs. 
 
Table 3. Summary of results for the two-version combinations 
Pairs of 
servers  
Total number 
of bug scripts 
run 
Failure observed 
(in at least one 
server) 
One out of two servers failing Both servers failing 
Self-
evident 
Non -self-
evident 
Non – 
Detectable 
Detectable 
Self-evident Non-self-evident 
IB + PG 62 43 17 25 1 0 0 
IB + OR 62 29 8 21 0 0 0 
IB + MS 69 35 11 21 2 1 0 
PG + OR 64 30 13 16 0 0 1 
PG + MS 76 46 18 21 1 6 0 
OR + MS 71 14 7 7 0 0 0 
 
 
5. Common faults 
  
We now discuss the bugs that caused coincident 
failures, listed in Table 4. We give some details about the 
functions affected and conjectures about the probable 
severity and frequency of failure as a function of the 
environment of use of the server. 
There were 13 bugs in total that were originally 
reported for one server but caused failure in another. 12 
caused a failure in both the server for which they were 
reported and another server. One bug (MSSQL bug 
report 56775) was reported for MSSQL, did not cause 
failure in MSSQL (possible Heisenbug) but did cause 
failure in PostgreSQL. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Bugs that cause coincident 
failures. The table should be read 
horizontally to know for which server the 
bug was reported, and vertically to know 
in which other server it caused a failure. 
 IB PG OR MS 
IB N/A 1  - (Bug ID 223512) 0 
2– (BugID’s 
217042(3), 
222476) 
PG 0 N/A 0 
2 – (BugID’s 
43 and 77) 
OR 0 
1 –  
(Bug ID 1059835) 
N/A 0 
MS 
1- 
(BugID 
58544) 
5 – (BugID’s 54428, 
56516, 58158, 58253, 
351180) 
0 N/A 
 
Arithmetic-related bugs 
PostgreSQL bug report 77 and Oracle bug report 
1059835 [8] describe arithmetic precision problems, 
causing incorrect result failures. The Oracle bug 1059835 
affects the MOD (modular arithmetic) operator, probably 
causing higher consequence failures.  The failure rates for 
these bugs would only be expected to be high in 
applications with high use of mathematical functions, not 
a typical use of SQL servers.  
Bugs affecting complex queries 
PostgreSQL bug 43 [8] causes a failure in both 
PostgreSQL and MSSQL. The complex SELECT 
statement below, with nested sub-queries, causes the 
failure:  
SELECT   P.ID AS ID, P.NAME AS NAME FROM PRODUCT 
P WHERE P.ID IN   
(SELECT ID FROM  PRODUCT WHERE  PRICE >= '9.00' 
AND  PRICE <= '50' AND  ID NOT IN  
((SELECT PRODUCT_ID FROM PRODUCT_SPECIAL 
WHERE START_DATE <= '2000-9-6' AND END_DATE >= 
'2000-9-6')  
UNION  
(SELECT PRODUCT_ID AS ID  FROM PRODUCT_SPECIAL 
WHERE PRICE >= '9.00' AND PRICE <= '50' AND 
START_DATE <= '2000-9-6' AND END_DATE >= '2000-9-6'))) 
Interestingly, for this same bug the two servers fail with 
different patterns. PostgreSQL fails returning a parsing 
error. MSSQL does not, but subsequently gives an 
incorrect result, probably because it built an incorrect 
parsing tree. 
MSSQL Bug 58544 [8] causes failures in both MSSQL 
and Interbase. Using a LEFT OUTER JOIN on a VIEW 
that uses the DISTINCT keyword causes the failure. A 
left outer join is a special type of outer join where if you 
have a join between tables T1 and T2 then the joined table 
unconditionally has a row for each row in T1 (as opposed 
to a Full Outer Join where the joined table has a row for 
each row present in both tables T1 and T2). The 
DISTINCT keyword subsequently eliminates all the 
duplicate rows from the joined table. Complex queries 
would be common on large databases with many tables, 
leading probably to a comparatively high failure rate, with 
possibly high failure severity, especially for incorrect 
result failures.   
Miscellaneous bugs 
Interbase Bug 223512(2) causes a failure in the Data 
Definition Language (DDL) part of SQL which is used to 
create/modify database objects (i.e. tables, views, users, 
procedures etc). It causes failures in both Interbase and 
PostgreSQL: both incorrectly allow a client to drop Views 
using the Drop Table statement. This violates the SQL-92 
standard, which allows Views to be dropped only via the 
Drop View statement. This bug would seem to cause 
infrequent failures in operation and it would normally 
require an error by an administrator. The severity of 
failures would also be expected to be low since a view is 
just a ‘virtual table’ (or a stored SELECT statement), 
which represents the data from one or more tables. No 
data are lost by dropping a view, although a runtime error 
will be generated each time a client attempts to access the 
dropped view. 
Interbase bug 217042(3) causes both Interbase and 
MSSQL to fail to validate the default values upon 
creation of tables. Therefore a statement like: 
CREATE TABLE TEST (A INT DEFAULT ‘ABC’) 
is allowed in both Interbase and MSSQL, even though an 
error should be raised since a string value (ABC) cannot 
be stored in an Integer type attribute. The DEFAULT 
attributes are used often in operation but it is not clear 
how often database users will define DEFAULT values of 
the wrong type. The failure to detect that an incorrect type 
default value is being assigned to a particular column at 
table creation time is non-detectable. However, a runtime 
error will occur, generating an error message, every time 
an attempt is made to insert the default value into the 
table: the failure will be detected, albeit with high 
latency
1
. 
  Interbase bug 222476 causes a failure in MSSQL as 
well. Both servers give empty field names for avg 
(average) and sum SQL functions, although they return 
correct results in these fields. This would be a serious 
problem for client applications that construct their output 
from the field names and results returned by the server.  
Five of the MSSQL bug scripts also caused failure in 
PostgreSQL, but with the difference that PostgreSQL fails 
at the beginning of the bug script. This implies that the 
causes are probably different for the two products, and the 
“failure regions” (sets of demands that would trigger the 
bug) identified by such scripts for the two servers only 
partially overlap: there are variations of the script for 
                                                          
1 If we classify the database as part of the server system, the common 
terminology recommended in [15] would imply that assigning the wrong 
type is an internal error, which only becomes a failure and is detected 
when the attempt is made to insert the default value. 
  
which PostgreSQL fails but MSSQL does not. For 
example, MSSQL bug 54428 causes an incorrect  
“primary key constraint” failure in MSSQL. The same 
bug causes failure (at the beginning of the bug script) 
when an attempt is made to create a clustered index in 
PostgreSQL. The latter is a known bug for PostgreSQL, 
and its correction in the later release 7.0.3 causes 
PostgreSQL not to fail on any of these five scripts. 
    
6. Discussion 
 
6.1. Extrapolating from the counts of common 
bugs to reliability of a diverse server 
 
These numbers are intriguing and point to a potential 
for serious dependability gains from assembling a fault 
tolerant server from two or more of these off-the-shelf 
servers. But they are not definitive evidence. Apart from 
the sampling difficulties caused e.g. by lack of certain bug 
scripts, it is important to clarify to what extent our 
observations allow us to predict such gains. 
For brevity, we consider the simplest case: suppose 
that users of a certain database server product A try to 
obtain a more dependable service by using a fault-
tolerant, replicated, diverse server AB, built from product 
A plus another product B (for discussion of the feasibility 
and design problems, see [21]). The number of bugs 
reported over a certain reference period (say one year) for 
product A is mA. Our study then finds that of these mA 
bugs, only mAB also caused failure of B. We may then 
expect that, had these users been using AB instead of A, 
only those failures of A that were due to those mA bugs 
could have caused complete service failures. How much 
more reliable would this have made the AB server, 
compared to the A server?  
Before proceeding, we introduce some more 
simplifications. The possible effects of individual server 
failures on system failures have been discussed in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.3, under the definitions of “self-
evident” and “detectable” failures. Here, for the sake of 
brevity, we use a simplified scenario: failures of both 
servers A and B on the same demand are “system 
failures”, and failures of a single one of them are not
2
. In 
addition, we only consider the effects on reliability of the 
factor that we have studied: the diversity between faults 
of the two products A and B. We thus ignore any effects 
of the middleware needed in the AB server, which adds 
complexity and thus possibly faults; and of added 
                                                           
2 This simplified model is still realistic if either: i) we are only 
concerned with interruptions of service, and all failures of A and/or B 
are detectable (crashes, self-detected errors, or different erroneous 
results if both A and B fail); or ii) we are concerned with undetected 
erroneous results, and all failures of both A and B on the same demand 
are pessimistically assumed to produce such results. 
complexity in client applications that used complex 
vendor-specific features of server A, if they must be 
adapted to use the more restricted feature set of server 
AB. With these simplifications, the AB server is certain to 
be at least as reliable as the single A server because it 
only fails if both A and B fail. We still need to assess the 
size of the probable reliability gain. To this end, we need 
to take into account various complications: the difference 
between fault records and failure records; imperfect 
failure reporting; variety of usage profiles. 
We can start with a scenario in which our data would 
be sufficient for trustworthy predictions, and then discuss 
the effects of these assumptions not holding in practice. 
This ideal scenario is as follows:  we are interested in the 
reliability gains for a database installation using server A, 
if it were to switch to a diverse server AB, assuming that 
this installation has a usage profile (probabilities of all 
possible demands on the server) similar to the average of 
all the bug-reporting installations of server A
3
. We 
assume that users neither change their patterns of usage of 
the databases (demand profile) nor upgrade to new 
releases of the database servers
4
; that all failures that 
affected installations of A during the reference year were 
noticed and reported; and that there is exactly one bug 
report for each failure that occurred.  
Then, we can state that the bug reports describe a one-
year sample of operation of the system, and our best 
reliability prediction is that the same set of users, during 
another year of operation, would experience a mean 
number mA of system failures if they used A, but only 
mAB if they used AB.  With the numbers we observed, 
the ratio mAB / mA is quite small, so the expected 
reliability gain would be large. Given that the reports 
come from millions of installations, each submitting 
many demands
5
, we might even trust that the true failure 
probability per demand is close to the observed frequency 
of failures. 
The first difficulty with this analysis is that reports 
concern bugs, not how many failures each caused. They 
                                                          
3  Or, from a market-assessment viewpoint, we may consider the average 
reliability gains for the population of all database installations which 
depend on server A, if they switched to using AB. 
4 Because we wish to reason about the reliability effects of diversity 
alone. This scenario also has practical interest, though. Usage patterns 
vary over time, but periods of very slow variations must exist; users do 
upgrade to new versions, but upgrades bring expense and new problems, 
so that it is interesting to see whether diversity would be a more cost-
effective way of achieving good average dependability over a system’s 
lifetime than frequent upgrades. 
5 How to define a “demand” to a state-rich system like a database server, 
for the purpose of inference about reliability, is a tricky theoretical and 
practical issue. For this informal discussion of other difficulties in 
inference, we ask the reader to accept that a practical solution can be 
found, somewhere between a single command and the whole sequence 
of commands over the lifetime of an installation. (cf e.g. [29]for 
examples of useful compromises). 
  
do not tell us whether a bug has a large or a small effect 
on reliability, although the faults that did not cause 
failures would tend to have stochastically lower effect on 
reliability than those that caused failures. Thus, the mAB 
bugs which still cause the fault tolerant server AB to fail 
may account for a large (perhaps close to 100%) or a 
small fraction (perhaps close to 0) of the failures observed 
in A’s operation. The actual reliability gain may be 
anywhere between negligible and very high.  
Software is often assessed in terms of number of bugs 
remaining. But it is easily seen that the bug reports do not 
give us any information on this number: the mA bugs 
reported may be the only bugs in the products, or they 
may be a fraction of them (perhaps minimal), which 
happened to be the ones causing failures during the 
reference year. 
Another difficulty is not knowing how many of the 
failures that occur are actually reported. This fraction is 
certainly less than 100%. If all failures had the same 
probability of being reported, the ratio between our 
predicted failure counts for AB and A would still be the 
ratio mAB / mA, although both terms in the ratio would be 
larger and affected by wider uncertainty. Reporting is 
probably biased, for instance towards bugs that cause 
higher frequency or higher severity of failures. Some 
failures – like crashes – are more noticeable than others, 
like storing incorrect data in some data fields, which may 
not produce visible effects for a long time (also making it 
more difficult to trace the visible problem back to its 
cause). Some users are more assiduous at producing 
failure reports, so the bugs that affect them more are also 
more likely to be reported, even if not so important for 
other users. 
In the end, we do not know in detail how failure reporting 
differs between different bugs, but bug reports are likely 
to be better evidence about bugs that cause blatant failures 
than about subtle (arguably more dangerous) failures. 
This prompts another consideration: as reported bugs are 
corrected and products mature, more of their failures are 
likely to be of the subtler types, unlikely to be reported. 
Therefore failure underreporting probably causes a bias 
towards underestimating the frequency of failures for 
which diversity would help. This makes diversity a more 
attractive defence, but it also means that bug reports will 
become a less and less accurate representation of the set 
of failures actually occurring.  
Last, we have the problem of usage profiles. A single 
user organisation needs predictions about the 
dependability of its specific installation of server AB or A 
(i.e., with or without diversity), which depends on its 
specific usage profile, which differs – perhaps by much – 
from the aggregate profile of the user population which 
generated the bug reports.  Installations that manage 
different databases, with different user needs, are 
subjected to different usage profiles. It is then plausible 
that different bugs are important for different 
installations; this conjecture is also supported by a 
possible interpretation of Adams’ findings [1] about the 
surprisingly small average failure rates of many bugs, 
when averaged over many installations. Then, the number 
of bugs whose effects can be tolerated (what we have 
counted here) gives little information about the resulting 
dependability gains. The actual effect can only be 
determined empirically. The user organisation may seek 
indirect evidence from the publicly available bug reports: 
if they generally match the failures experienced locally, 
the local effects of tolerating those bugs can be assessed. 
However if it does not, little insight is gained, and the 
exercise is time-consuming. 
 
6.2. Decisions about deploying diversity 
 
We have underscored that these results are only prima 
facie evidence for the usefulness of diversity.  
A better analysis would be obtained from the actual 
failure reports (including failure counts), available to the 
vendors, especially if they use automatic failure reporting 
mechanisms (users are biased towards under-reporting of 
failures from bugs they have reported before, or for which 
they have successful workarounds or recovery 
mechanisms), and even better if they also have indications 
about the users’ usage profile (from rough measures like 
the size of the database managed, to detailed monitoring 
as proposed in [31]). However, vendors are often wary of 
sharing such detailed dependability information with their 
customers.  
How can then individual user organisations decide 
whether diversity is a suitable option for them, with their 
specific requirements and usage profiles? As usual for 
dependability-enhancing measures, the cost is reasonably 
easy to assess: costs of the software products, the required 
middleware, difficulties with client applications that 
require vendor-specific features, hardware costs, run-time 
cost of the synchronisation and consistency enforcing 
mechanisms, and possibly more complex recovery after 
some failures. The gains in improved reliability and 
availability (from fewer system failures and easier 
recovery from some failures, set against possible extra 
failures due to the added middleware), and possibly less 
frequent upgrades, are difficult to predict except 
empirically. This uncertainty will be compounded, for 
many user organisations, by the lack of trustworthy 
estimates of their baseline reliability with respect to subtle 
failures: databases are used with implicit confidence that 
failures will be self-evident.  
We note that for some users the evidence we have 
presented would already indicate a diverse server to be a 
reasonable and relatively cheap precautionary choice, 
even without good predictions of its effects. These are 
  
users who have: serious concerns about dependability 
(e.g., high costs for interruptions of service or undetected 
incorrect data being stored); applications which use 
mostly the core features common to multiple off-the-shelf 
products (recommended by practitioners to improve 
portability of the applications); modest throughput 
requirements for updates, which make it easy to accept 
the synchronisation delays of a fault-tolerant server.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
To estimate the possible advantages of modular-
redundant diversity in complex off-the-shelf software, we 
studied a sample of bug reports from four popular off-the-
shelf SQL database server products. We checked whether 
more than one product exhibited bugs that would cause 
common-mode failures if the products were used in a 
diverse redundant architecture. It appears that such 
common bugs are rare. We found very few bugs that 
affected two of the four servers, and none that affected 
more than two. Moreover only four of these bugs would 
cause identical, undetectable failures in two servers. 
Fault-tolerant, diverse servers seem to have a good chance 
of improving failure rates and availability. 
These preliminary results must be taken with caution, 
as discussed in Section 6, but are certainly interesting and 
indicate that this topic deserves further study. Their 
immediate implications vary between users, but there are 
classes of database server installations for which even 
these preliminary results seem to recommend diversity as 
a prudent and cost-effective strategy. Decisions would of 
course involve many other considerations which we could 
not discuss here: performance, total cost of ownership 
including updates, risks of dependence on one vendor, 
etc. 
The practical obstacle would be the need for 
“middleware”: most users would need an off-the-shelf 
middleware package, which in turn is not likely to be 
developed until there are enough users. On the other hand, 
a dedicated user could develop a middleware package in 
the hope of seeing his investment amplified through the 
creation of an open-source community of user/developers. 
But once the diverse server is running, the dependability 
changes due to diversity could be directly assessed. The 
user could decide on an ongoing basis which architecture 
is giving the best trade-off between performance and 
dependability, from a single server to the most pessimistic 
fault-tolerant configuration (with tight synchronisation 
and comparison of results at each query). 
Some other interesting observations include: 
- it may be worthwhile for vendors to test their servers 
using the known bug reports for other servers. For 
example, we observed 4 MSSQL bugs that had not 
been reported in the MSSQL service packs (previous 
to our observation period). Oracle was the only server 
that never failed when running on it the reported bugs 
of the other servers;  
- the majority of bugs reported, for all servers, led to 
“incorrect result” failures (64.5%) rather than crashes 
(17.1%) (despite crashes being more obvious to the 
user). This is contrary to the common assumption that 
the majority of bugs lead to an engine crash, and 
warrants more attention by users to fault-tolerant 
solutions, and by designers of fault-tolerant solutions 
to tolerating subtle and non fail-silent failures. 
Future work that is desirable includes: 
- repeating this study on later releases of the servers, to 
verify whether the general conclusions drawn here 
are repeated, indicating that they are the 
consequences of factors that do not disappear with 
the evolution of the software products;  
- statistical testing to assess the actual reliability gains. 
This is already under way. We have run a few million 
queries with various loads including experiments 
based on the TPC-C benchmark. We have not 
observed any failures so far (however, with the TPC-
C load we found that a significant gain in 
performance can be obtained with diverse servers 
[9]).  We plan to continue these experiments with 
more complete test loads. These are important for 
their own sake, as evidence for decision-making, but 
also for the side benefit of checking how far the data 
confirm the impressions gained from this study, and 
thus how accurate a picture fault reports paint for 
these products; 
- studying alternative options for software fault 
tolerance with OTS servers, e.g. wrappers rephrasing 
queries into alternative, logically equivalent sets of 
statements to be sent to replicated, even non-diverse 
servers [9];  
- developing the necessary components for users to be 
able to try out diversity in their own installations, 
since the main obstacle now is the lack of popular 
off-the-shelf “middleware” packages for data 
replication with diverse SQL servers. 
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